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  • target for an attack was Syria. If Israel attacked Syria, Hussein continued, Jordan would not take action unless the U.A.R. intervened, 1 From Tel Aviv, tel. 3648, May 18, 1967, secret/nodis. 2 Memorandum of telephone conversation between Harman
  • ..~./ This kind of encouragement and support for the Shah's reform program was given frequently. It formed the keystone of subsequent exchanges and conversations. The closeness of personal relations between the Shah and the President lent
  • 27, 1964 ~ONFIDENTIAL) , ... 1874 and 1889, February 20, 1964 {SECRET}_, and 2316, April 5, 1964 ·(SECRE'f); Memo­ randum o·f Conversation between President Johnson and UAR Ambassador Kamel, May 25, 1964 (SECFET),_ ll From Cairo, Telegram 1995, March
  • of State Memorandum of Rusk-Brown Conversation, January 11, 1968 (Secret/EXDIS). SECREf time he stated his own objectives in the Gulf, largely revolving about five mid-Gulf islands disputed between Iran '}_/ On February 1, at and the British-protected
  • of Defense N i tze.2 In a late - September conversation with B razilian F o reign Minister Araujo Castro^ Secretary of State Rusk said that Cuban r , ^■JCSM-8'2 8 - 62 j "Nuclear ~ Fz“ ee or Missile - Free Zones (U)/' Oct. 2 6 , 19 6 2 See also JCSM
  • of decision." Conversely, failure of the larger effort would create conditions in which the FRG would not be content with the MLF, even if it C evolved into a European force. Referring to the State Department view that MLF decisions should not be taken
  • Department telegrams, airgrams, memoranda of conversation, office memoranda, and position papers. There are also classified minutes of the meetings of the Committee of Principals, the ACDA staff, and the Research Council. The views of other agencies on arms